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CHAPTER IX
RESULTS OF PRICE ANALYSIS
Introduction
The results of the analyses outlined in Chapter V are presented
in three main sections of this chapter. The first section presents
results of the analysis of price efficiency from port to farm level.
The next section contains results of price efficiency from Japan
to exporting country port level. The relationship of marketing boards
to price levels and variability are examined in the third section.
Each section presents the main hypothesis to be examined,
then outlines the model specification used, presents the results of the
price efficiency analysis, and discusses tentative conclusions drawn
from the analysis.
The Argentine grain marketing system was controlled by the
National Grain Board(NGB) from August 1973 to March 1976.'
Therefore, it was necessary to separate the price efficiency
analysis into two periods: the first from 1973-1976, the second
from 1977-1980. This division allowed Argentine prices to be
analyzed under a market-managed and a market-oriented system.
To allow valid comparisons to be made across countries, this
time separation was maintained in each country at both levels.
South Africa was not included in the analysis of price efficiency
from the port to farm level because the Maize Board merely implements
the floor price scheme for sorghum. The Maize Board, in fact,
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encourages producer sales to the private trade, thereby minimizing
the effect of the board. Australia was under a board system
during both periods and was analyzed as such. The Texas grain
marketing system reflects the least degree of intervention
of any system examined. It provides the market-oriented
perspective during both periods and is used for comparison
purposes.
The first analysis examined price efficiency between port
and farm levels. Prices were analyzed for Argentina, Australia,
and Texas allowing for the time separations above. Rates of
price adjustment were compared across countries to determine if
farm prices in any system responded more rapidly than the others
to changes at the port level.
The second section analyzed price efficiency between Japan
and the exporting country port level. All four exporting
countries were included in this analysis with the same time
separations as above. Price adjustment coefficients were used to
determine which prices responded most rapidly to the Japanese
price.
The effect of marketing boards on price level and variability
were examined in the third section. The Argentine and Australian
systems were analyzed from 1969-1980 to determine if their respective
boards had raised and stabilized prices.
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Price Efficiency Analysis from Port to Farm Level
Hypothesis 1 - Marketing board systems respond less rapidly
to changes in world price level than nonboard systems.
A system of partial adjustment distributed lag equations was
specified to evaluate the rate at which price information is transmitted
between levels within the four marketing systems. Simple regression
equations estimated jointly were used to examine the accuracy with which
price information was passed between levels. Monthly average grain
sorghum price data to test these relationships. The specific purpose
of this analysis was to compare adjustment coefficients across
countries to determine if the relative speeds of adjustment were
different.
The test for the difference between two regression coefficients
was used to determine whether or not rates of adjustment, intercepts,
and slopes were significantly greater in a particular country. The
test was:
t= bi-bj/>Jyar(bi)+Var(bj)-2Cov(bi,bj) (Kmenta, p.372),
where Var(bi) represents the variance of the respective estimated
coefficients and Cov(bi) is the covariance between these coefficients.
This is. evaluated as a t test statistic and determines if the
coefficients from the two equations are. significantly different under
the null hypothesis Hot bi=bj.
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Japan is included as the main source of demand for grain sorghum
because it accounts for about one-half of world sorghum imports and is
the major market for each of the aforementioned exporting countries
(table 7^.23) . Monthly corn prices at Rotterdam were included since
corn is a substitute for sorghum in many end uses.
Model Specification
The following distributed lag models were used in this analysis.
Distributed Lag Models
Argentina
10.1 = alh +'h-bu ^t-l + ^1 b12 Tlt + M b13 Clt
+ (1-Ap Plt_1 + \-l b14 ^t-2 + elt
Australia
10.2 *2t = a2A2 b21 *2t-l + ^2 b22 T2t + ^2b23C2t
+ X2 b24 W2t + (1“X2) p2t-l + ^t-2 + e2t
Texas
10.3 ^t ” A3a 3 + A3 b31 ^t-l + a3 b32
+ (1-A3} P3t-1 +A3 b34P^-2 + 6
T3t + X3 b33 C3t
where:
it
cit
W
2t
* monthly average farm price for grain sorghum at time t in
ith country
- monthly average port level (f.o.b.) price for grain
sorghum at time t in ith country
- monthly average transport charges for heavy grains at time t in
country i
= monthly average price of corn at time t in Rotterdam
« monthly average price of stockfeed wheat at time t in Australia
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j - monthly farm price for grain sorghum in country
i lagged j periods
^ = rate of adjustment in ith country
Et = error term in ith country + ®t2 (see equation 5.4)
The farm price was lagged two periods to allow testing
model specification. If the second lag was not significant and the
first lag was, the model was correctly specified and fit the one period
lag structure. The basic concept for this application of
causality under the distributed lag hypothesis is found in
ELndyck and Rubinfeld. The analysis provided an empirical
test of the relationship between variables in different
time periods. It allows an explicit test of the hypot¬
hesis that prices at time t at a given level in a particular
country are a function of prices in t-1 and t-2. If the
coefficient on the second lag(t-2) is not significant, while
the first lag was significant, one may conclude that the
price in t-1 lead the price in t and the first lag
specification was correct.
The speed of price adjustment was based on the following
criteria: the coefficient of adjustment (A) was evaluated for each
country at the port and farm levels to determine if it was
significantly different from unity, since unity implies instantaneous
adjustment. Conversely, this hypothesis may be evaluated directly
from the model as Ho: (1—A) ® 0. If one fails to reject Ho,
instantaneous adjustment was occurring. The coefficient of adjustment
was then compared across equations (countries) to determine if
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idjustment was occurring at a greater rate at different levels in
a particular country.
Initial estimates of the parameters were made in common log form,
percent change of logs, and linear form. Insignificant variables were
removed and the equations were reestimated. Because of mixed performance
of the log linear models, it was apparent that they were not superior
to hte linear models. Therefore, in the interest of simplicity all
estimates were made in linear form,
were made in linear form.
Regression Models
To evaluate the second aspect of price efficiency, accuracy,
regression models were specified for the grain marketing system in each
country. The perfect market concept suggested by Bressler and King
(p. 413) was used, which closely follows the Thompson and Dahl analysis.
The efficiency criteria used to evaluate accuracy tested for the
strength of the relationship between prices at different levels in the
marketing channel and determined how closely price differentials
approximate transport costs. Monthly average grain sorghum prices at
the farm, port elevator, and c and f prices in Japan were used to
examine pricing accuracy within each country. Slope and intercept
terms were compared across countries to determine relative accuracy.
The destination price can be expressed as:
10.4 Id * ft) + G + E
where ft) is origin price, C is transfer cost (including transport) and
E is a random error term. If Ri is adjusted for freight, 10.4 becomes:
10.5 RL - Cf ■ R) + Ct+E where Cf is freight between destination and
origin and Ct represents costs of transfer other than freight. Now
10.5 can be estimated as a single equation with the intercept term
reflecting the cost (other than freight) of moving grain between
origin and destination.
Simple regression models were specified for each country as:
Argentina
*
10.6 P? = a + BP^ + e^t t t
Australia
*
10. 7 jP - a + BF^+ et
South Africa
X
10.8 I? * a + b/ + et t t
Texas
*
10.9 pP = a + BP^+ e
where the following refer to data within each country:
P^ ® monthly average farm price for grain sorghum,
P£ - monthly average port price (feO.b.) for grain sorghum
in period t, adjusted for transportation between farm and
port level.
The B value from each equation was tested to determine its
significance level which reflects the strength of the relationship
between prices, therefore the accuracy of the price adjustments. B
also was tested for unity which would
indicate a less than perfect one-to-one relationship between prices.
The 3's were compared at the same marketing level among the countries
to determine if the marketing system in a particular country more
accurately reflected world price conditions.
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The intercepts from each equation were compared to determine
which countries had lower transfer costs exclusive of transport*
Seasonal quarterly dummy variables were placed in each model and
tested for significance.
Results of Price Efficiency Analysis from Bart to Farm Level -
Period 1973-76
The three distributed lag models were tested for fit by including
the second lag of farm price as an independent variable. This
coefficient was not significant in any of the equations, while the farm
price lagged one period was significant in each equation (table 98).
Therefore, the partial adjustment distributed lag model was the correct
specification. The distributed lag estimates were made in real domestic
currency, thereby eliminating the effects of changes in the general price
level. Because the intercepts and slopes of the simple regression models
had to be compared across countries, estimates were made in real U.S.
dollars. The seasonal dummy variables were not significant in any model.
Initial parameter estimates were made in linear form; all coefficients
not significant at 90 percent were dropped from the model and the model
was reestimated. Log estimates of the simple regression models were
attempted, but resulted in less significant estimates than linear models.
Therefore Tables 98 and 99 are final linear estimates of the distributed
lag and regression models. Comparisons among the countries are made in
Table 99.
The Argentine farm price was found to be a function of only the
c and f price for sorghum in Japan and the lagged farm price (table 98).
Table 98. Resulcs of Distributed Lag Analysis of Farm Level Grain
Sorghum Brices, 1973-76
Variables Ihrameter Estimates3,
DEP VAR: Farm Price Argentina Australia Texas
Mean Value ?1,05S.16 SA75.73 $96.73
Intercept 648.32 -1.15 33.76
(3.56) (-.21) (15.51)
Trend Var. -.0011
(-1.17)
c and f Sorghum
Japan -.038
(2.85)
f.o.b. Sorghum .553 .265
(3.35) (1.80)
f.o.b. Sorghum
lagged one month -.589
(-3.06)
cif Corn - Rotterdam -.635 .322
(-2.93) (2.73)
cif Corn - Rotterdam
lagged one month .069 -.335
(2.32) (-3.24)
Transport rate
farm to port 6.83 .945
(7.09) (2.10)
Transport rate
lagged one month -3.68
(-2.50)
Farm Brice - Sorghum
lagged one month .630 .750 .321
(5.99) 14.91) (2.37)
Coefficient of
adjustment .370 .250 .679
(11.1) (.980) (3.19)
1-Square .762 .976 .619
Significance of
Overall Model .0001 .0001 .0001
£
All estimates are in domestic real currencies per MT. lumbers
in parentheses are t-values; any value greater in absolute value
than 2.03 indicates statistical significance at .05 level.
Table 99. Results of Simple Regression Model Analysis of Adjusted
Ibrt Level Brice and Farm Brice of Grain Sorghum, 1973-76
DEP VAR: ADJF0Ba
Variables
Argentina Australia S. Africa
Parameter Estimates0
Texas
Intercept 90.39
(22.37)
7.31
(4.32)
62.14
(5.01)
73.27
(6.16)
Farm Price for
Sorghum (slope) .132
(1.15)
.776
(26.35)
.428
(2.77)
.344
(2.82)
R-Square .0019 .943 .252 .316
Correlation .0000 .890 .063 .10
Slope Significantly
Different from One Yes Yes Yes Yes
Significance of
Overall Model .804 .0001 .0021 .0004
All estimates in real U.S. dollars per MT; ADJFOB is port price
minus transport charges from farm level to port.
^t-values are in parentheses; a number greater in absolute value
than 2.03 indicates significance at .05 level.
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The first estimates were made in nominal pesos, but resulted in a
lagged farm price with a negative coefficient.
Deflating the prices resulted in a positive coefficient estimate.
Although the Japanese price was significant, it had a negative sign
indicating that a one peso increase in Japan resulted in a P.04 decline
in Argentina. This may seem counter intuitive at first, but reflects
the relationship between the Argetine peso and Japanese yen during this
period. As the yen was increasing in value, the peso was declining.
The R-square of this equation was .762 indicating that the
variables were explaining about three-fourths of the variation in farm
price. The coefficient of adjustment was .37 suggesting that about
one-third of the adjustment in farm price occurred during the first
month. Approximately 6.5 months were required for full adjustment to
occur.
The coefficient of determination for the Australian model was
0.976. The lagged farm price was significant at the .05 level and had
a positive coefficient as expected. The coefficient of adjustment was
.250, indicating that one-fourth of the adjustment in farm price
occurred during the first month,however it was not significant. About
ten months (10.4) were required for 95 percent of the adjustment in
farm price to occur. The prices of f.o.b. sorghum and lagged f.o.b.
sorghum at the port were significant and indicated that a one $A
increase in sorghum during the present month resulted in a $A.53
increase at the farm during the same month, other variables constant.
The lagged f.o.b. price was negative indicating that high prices in
the previous month resulted in lower prices the following month.
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A time trend variable was added to this model in an attempt
to explain the positive transport coefficient. Although
the coefficient remained positive, the lagged value became
negative and highly significant. The lagged transport coefficient
indicated that a $A3.68 increase in transport rates during hte
current month reduced farm price by $A1.00 the following month.
The Texas model had a coefficient of determination of .619, The
lagged farm price coefficient was positive and indicated significance at
the .05 level. Over two-thirds of the adjustment in farm price occurred
during the first month (.68) and 2.6 months were required for 95
percent of the adjustment to occur. The f.o.b. port price for sorghum
was significant at the .10 level indicating that a one dollar per MT
increase at the port resulted in a $.27 increase at the farm level.
The coefficient for c.i.f. corn at Rotterdam revealed that a $.32
increase in the farm price resulted from a one dollar increase in corn.
The transport coefficient was positive, implying that a one
dollar increase in rates resulted in a $.95 increase in the farm price.
However, this result runs counter to the theory of derived demand
which requires that an increase in margin reduce demand, hence
price, at the farm level.
Time trend variables up to the third power were placed in
the model in an attempt to determine if the positive sign
was the result of unexplained trend in the data. However, these
variables were not effective because when significant, other
coefficients(c.i.f. corn and lagged farm price)became non-
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significant indicating multicollinearity between the trend
variable and the nonsignificant variable. The transport
rate was lagged up to five months in the presence of trend
variables, but the lagged coefficients were not significant.
Several factors may partially explain the poor performance of the
transport rate proxy. First, the rate was a proxy and estimated as
the difference between prices paid to farmers in central Texas and
theGulf. Gulf prices are subject to extreme fluctuation due to the
close proximity of the port. Prices in Central Texas may not reflect
all of the shocks affecting the Gulf price, resulting in wide
disparity, hence a poor proxy. Second, the use of price differentials
as transport may be confounded by the fact that storage costs were
assumed zero. This would result in an underestimation of the rate.
Third , close examination of the proxy revaled that month to month
changes were more extreme than normally expected of transport rates.
To answer the question of how closely farm prices follow the f.o.b.
port price adjusted for transport, simple regressions were applied to the
price series of each region.
Generally, a poor correlation was found between adjusted f.o.b.
price and farm price in each country except Australia (table 99). The
R-square was .94 with a correlation of .89 indicating a close
relationship between prices at the two levels. Although the intercept
was significant, it was the smallest of the four countries, $7.31.
The farm price coefficient was significant and revealed a slope of
.76 indicating a close relationship between prices. This evidence
suggests farm price and f.o.b. price were closely correlated.
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Argentine prices reflected the least correlation with an R-square
of .0019 and an intercept of $90.39. The Texas model had an intercept
term of $73.27 and an R-square of .316. Although South Africa was not
analyzed with the distributed lag model to determine speed of adjustment,
it was analyzed to determine how accurately price movements at the port
were reflected by farm prices. An R-square of .25 resulted, with an
intercept of $62.14.
Figures 19-22 show these relationships clearly. Notice as the
Argentine f.o.b. port price increased between August 1974 and
November 1975, the farm price declined, reflecting poor correlation
between the prices. The Texas and South African farm prices followed
their respective port prices fairly close, but not as closely as the
Australian farm price. The price received by members of the board was
slightly above the adjusted port price. Two factors may partially
explain this relationship: a) the transport rates used in this
analysis are average rates and may not be representative estimates at
any point in time, overestimating the actual rates for hauling grain
and b) it is probable that the board received a premium above the
average port price due to quality standards that are strictly
enforced. As the regression models indicate, the Australian system
most accurately reflected changes at the port level.
In comparing the results across countries it is important to note
that the slope and intercept terms were estimated in real U.S.
dollars, while the adjustment coefficients reflect the time dimension.
The speed of price adjustment in Texas was significantly greater than
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in Argentina or Australia (table 100). No significant differences
were found between the speed of price adjustment in the other systems.
The slope coefficients reveal that the Australian system more
accurately reflected price changes than any other system. No
significant differences existed between Texas and the other systems.
Comparison of intercept terms revealed that the Australian system had
significantly lower unexplained transfer costs than any of the other
systems. The South African system exhibited significantly lower
transfer costs than Argentina.
These results suggest that between 1973 and 1976 the marketing
board system in Australia reflected price changes at the port level
with less speed and greater accuracy than the Argentine or Texas
systems. The Australian port price also reflected less unexplained
transfer cost than the other systems.
Bsriod 1977-80
During this period the overall fit of the models was inferior to
the 1973-76 period. R-square ranged from .62 for Texas to .94 for
Australia. The Argentine model had an R-square of .66, indicating
that c and f sorghum in Japan, the f.o.b. port price, lagged port
price, and lagged farm price explained about two-thirds of the
variation in farm price (table 101). As before, the c and f price in
Japan was negative indicating that an increase would result in a .18
real peso decline in the farm price. The coefficient of adjustment
was .214, but was not significant, indicating very little adjustment
occurred in the first month.
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Table 100, Farm Level Country Comparisons of Adjustment Coefficients
from Distributed Lag Models and Slope Intercept Terms from Simple
Regression Models, 1973-76
Adjustment Coefficient
Comparison
Slope
Coefficients
Intercept
Comparison
TX > ARGb AUS > ARG AUS < ARG
(1.80) (5.36) (18.95)
AUS = ARG ARG = SA SA < ARG
( .50) * (1.52) ( 2.21)
TX > AUS TX = ARG TX > ARG
(1.37) (1.22) ( 1.37)
AUS > SA AUS < SA
(2.45) (4.76)
AUS > TX AUS < TX
(3.45) (5.57)
TX = SA TX = SA
( .46) ( .70)
^Texas * TX, Argentina = ARG, Australia = AUS, South Africa = 3A.
t values are in parentheses; a value greater than 1,69
indicates significance at .05 level,
significant at .10 level.
Table 101. Results of Distributed Lag Analysis of Farm Level Grain
Sorghum Prices, 1977-80
Variables Ihrameter Estimates
a
DEP VAR: Farm Price Argentina Australia Texas
Mean Value PI,191.16 $A63.17 $100.90
Intercept 254.12 2.77 17.32
c and f Sorghum -
Japan
(2.32)
-.179
(-1.69)
(1.20) (1.29)
f.o.b. Sorghum .161 .391 .208
f.o.b. Sorghum
(1.27) (4.21) (1.55)
lagged one month .069
(1.53)
-.339
(-3.32)
cif Cora - Rotterdam -.066
(-1.46)
.149
(1.28)
cif Corn - Rotterdam
lagged one month
Transport farm to
port
Farm Price Sorghum
.083
(1.87)
-.155
(-1.64)
.658
(2.51)
lagged one month .786 .863 .559
(10.28) (10.90) (5.31)
Coefficient of
adjustment .214 .137 .441
(.476) (.205) (2.59)
R-Square .658 .939 .618
Significance of
Overall Model .0001 .0001 .0001
All estimates are in domestic real currencies per MT. Numbers
in parentheses are t-values; any value greater in absolute value
than 2.00 indicates statistical significance at .05 level.
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The Australian model indicated that the f.o.b. port price for
sorghum and the lagged f.o.b. price were significant factors in
explaining the farm price. A one dollar A increase at the port
resulted in a $A.39 increase at the farm that same month. The c.i.f.
corn price at Rotterdam was negatively correlated with the farm price,
but was not significant. The adjustment coefficient was not
significant indicating very little adjustment occurred during the
first month.
The Texas model indicated that the f.o.b. port price was an
important factor in explaining farm price as was the lagged price of
corn at Rotterdam. However, the most significant variables in
explaining farm price were transportation and lagged farm price. The
results indicate that a one dollar increase in transport rates result
in a $.66 increase in the farm price. The coefficient of adjustment
was significant indicating that almost half (.44) of the adjustment in
farm price occurred during the first month. Five months were required
for full adjustment to occur, which is more than required in the
1973-76 period.
The results of the regression of adjusted port price on farm
price indicate that Australian prices had the strongest relationship
(table 102). The R-square for the Australian model was .752 and the
correlation between adjusted port price and farm price was .566. The
slope of this model was not significantly different from one at the
.05 level. The intercept was significant and indicated $8.49/MT
unexplained transfer cost between port and farm level.
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Table 102. Results of Simple Regression Model Analysis of Adjusted Bart
Level Price and Farm Price of Grain Sorghum, 1977-80
DEP VAR: ADJFOB3,
Variables
Argentina Australia S. Africa
Parameter Estimates0
Texas
Intercept 77.58
(16.76)
8.49
(1.41)
128.42
(11.84)
72.98
(7.42)
Farm Price for
Sorghum (slope) .294
(5.52)
.940
(13.84)
-.211
(-2.36)
.421
(4.32)
R-Square • 266 .752 .111 .272
Correlation .070 .566 .012 .074
Slope Significantly
Different from One Yes No Yes Yes
Significance of
Overall Model .0001 .0001 ..010 .0001
All estimates in real U.S. dollars per MT; ADJFOB is port price
minus transport chages from farm level to port.
t-values are in parentheses; a number greater in absolute value
than 2.00 indicates significance at .05 level.
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The Texas model exhibited a .07 correlation between adjusted port
and farm prices. However, the slope was significantly different from
one and a significant intercept was encountered, which indicated $73/MT
in unexplained transfer cost.
The Argentine model had an R-square of .266 and exhibited a .07
correlation between adjusted port and farm prices. The slope did not
equal one and $78 in unexplained transfer costs were reflected in the
intercept.
The South African model showed a very weak relationship between
port and farm prices as indicated by a .012 correlation. However,
this result may not be surprising when one considers that in many
seasons sorghum is exported at a loss and the port price may not be
the significant factor in setting the farm price. This model also had
the highest unexplained transfer cost,$128/MT.
In comparing the models to determine price efficiency, it should
be noted that the Texas system responded the quickest to changes in
the port price (table 103). However, the Australian model generated
the only slope that was not different from one and also exhibited the
highest correlation between adjusted port price and farm price.
Australia also had the smallest unexplained transfer cost. Therefore,
it was not possible to draw definite conclusions. It would appear
that the Texas system responded the quickest, while Australian farm
prices reflected changes in the port price more accurately than the
others.
It is not possible to arrive at a general conclusion concerning
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Table 103- Farm Level Country Comparisons of Adjustment Coefficients
from Distributed Lag Models and Slope and Intercept Terms from
Simple Regression Models, 1977-80
Adjustment Coefficient
Comparison
Slope
Coefficients
Intercept
Comparison
TX > ARGb AUS > ARG AUS < ARG
(1.70) (7.72) (9.42)
AUS = ARG ARG > SA ARG < SA
( .69) (6.09) (5.16)
TX > AUS TX > A|G TX = ARG
(2.31) (1.27) ( .41)
AUS > SA AUS < SA
(9.29) (8.87)
AUS > TX AUS < TX
(4.41) (5.63)
TX > SA TX < SA
(4.76) (3.77)
^Texas = TX, Argentina = ARG, Australia = AUS, South Africa = SA.
t values are in parentheses; a value greater than 1.65
indicates significance at .05 level,
indicates significance at .10 level.
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hypothesis one based on this evidence. Daring the first period (1973-76)
the Australian system reflected changes in the f.o.b. port price more
accurately than the market-oriented Texas system. There was no
significant difference in the speed of price adjustment in the two
systems. Therefore, with specific reference to the Australian system,
hypothesis one can be rejected and it may be concluded that the
market-managed grain marketing system responded more accurately and as
quickly as the market-oriented Texas system. The Texas system responded
more quickly than the Argentine, but no significant differences were
found regarding accuracy within the two systems. Therefore, one must
fail to reject hypothesis one in the Argentine case and conclude that
the farm price responded slower, but as accurately as the Texas
farm price.
Price Efficiency Analysis Between Japan and Exporting Country Ibrt Level
Model Specification
As before, partial adjustment distributed lag equations were
specified for each country analyzed.
Distributed lag models
Argentina
Australia
+ ^•2b23C
2t + X2b24XC2t
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South Africa
10.12 *3t = a 3 X3 + b3lX|3t + ^t-i^3 + \3 b32 F3t
+^3b33C3t + *3b34XC3t + (1_X3) P3^t-1 + e3t
Texas
10*13 *4t =Ha4 + M b41 P4t +Pt-1^4 + h b42 p4t
\b43C4t + (1"V P4?t-1 + a4t
where:
t-1 is as before
jP
it is as before
is as before
e. is as before
it
pj
it = monthly average c and f price for No. 2 yellow sorghum
in Japan, a proxy for world demand
=* monthly average ocean freight rate for heavy grains
between ith exporting country and Japan
Cit = cif corn at Rotterdam,
XCit = rate of exchange between foreign currency and U.S. dollar.
To examine the accuracy between the importing c and f price and
the export f.o.b. price, simple regression models were used.
Argentina
.*
10.14 = a + BF^+ et
Australia
*
10.15 = a + BP?+ e
t t t
South Africa
■k
10.16 pj = a + BPP+ e
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^^xas
*
1°-17 = a + BiP+ et
where the following refer to data within each country:
jj! « average monthly price for grain sorghum at port level
(f.o.b.)
Pj? = monthly average c and f price for grain sorghum in
Japan in period t, adjusted for ocean freight between
exporting country and Japan.
Results of Price Efficiency Analysis Between Japan and Exporting
Country Bart Level Bariod 1973-76
Distributed lag estimates were generated for all four major
exporting countries. The initial estimates were examined for
coefficients not significant at .90 level and then reestimated without
those variables in the model. The results are presented in Table 104.
Seasonal dummy variables were included, but were not significant. All
estimates are in domestic real currencies.
The results of the Aregetine model indicate the current c and f
price in Japan was a significant factor in establishing the port
price in Buenos Aires. A one peso increase in the c and f price
resulted in a .56 increase in the f.o.b. price the same month. The
lagged c and f coefficient indicated that a one peso increase in Japan
resulted in a P.34 decline in Argentina the following month. The
coefficient of adjustment indicated that one-fourth of the adjustment
of the port price occurred in the first month, but was not significant.
Stockfeed wheat prices and the lagged f.o.b. port price were
found to be the most important variables affecting the Australian port
Table 104. Results of Distributed Lag Analysis of Port Level Grain
Sorghum Prices, 1973-76
Variables Ehramecer Estimates*
DEP VAR: FOB Argentina Australia S. Africa Texas
Port Price -
Mean Value ?5,075.15 $A79.43 R84.37 $111.11
Intercept -188.95 10.47 2.46 22.70
(-.91) (2.97) (.310) (1.24)
c and f Sorghum -
Japan .562 .012 .461 .143
(7.28) (1.24) (4.66) (1.06)
c amd f Sorghum
lagged one month -.339 -.274
(-2.95) (-2.54)
Stockfeed Wheat .394
(4.98)
cif Corn -
Rotterdam .448
(3.92)
cif Corn -
lagged one month -2.56
(-2.22)
fob Sorghum -
lagged one month .755 .412 .742 .398
(7.50) (4.32) (6.85) (2.84)
Coefficient of
adjustment .245 .589 .258 .602
(.509) (10.94) (.301) (2.54)
El-Square .966 .949 .763 .571
Significance of
Overall Model .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001
a
Ail estimates are in domestic real currencies per MT. Numbers
in parentheses are t-values; any value greater in absolute value
than 2.03 indicates statistical significance at .05 level.
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price. The stockfeed wheat coefficient indicates that a one dollar A
increase results in a $A.39 in the port price. The adjustment
coefficient indicated that about 60 percent of the adjustment in
f.o.b. price occurred during the first month. Three months were
required for 95 percent of the price adjustment to occur. Therefore,
the port price in any month reflects a large portion of available
price information.
The most significant factors affecting the South African port
price were the c and f price, lagged c and f price, and lagged port
price. The lagged c and f price (Japan) was significant and negative
indicating an inverse relationship between port and import prices. A
one Rand increase in the c and f price resulted in a R.46 increase in
the South African port price. The coefficient of adjustment was .26
indicating very slow response to chanes in explanatory factors, but
was not significant.
The Texas model indicated that lagged f.o.b. price and c.i.f.
corn in Rotterdam were the most significant factors affecting port
prices at the Gulf. A one dollar increase in the c.i.f. price
resulted in a $.45 increase in the Gulf port price. A one dollar
increase in lagged c.i.f. yielded a $.26 decline in Gulf prices. The
coefficient of adjustment indicated that almost two-thirds of the
price adjustment was occurring in the initial month. About three and
one-quarter months were required for 95 percent of price adjustment to
occur•
The simple regression results indicate a relatively strong
relationship between the adjusted c and f price in Japan and port prices
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in Texas (table 105). The slope was significantly different from zero,
but not equal to one. Texas had the smallest unexplained transfer cost
reflected by an intercept term of $53.24/MT. Australia had the highest
unexplained transfer cost at $106.57/MT.
A poor correlation was found between c and f Japan prices and port
prices in the other countries. South Africa had a correlation of .12,
Argentina had .34, and Australia had .006. Australia did not have a
slope different from zero reconfirming the weak relationship between
the port price and c and f Japan.
In comparing the countries, it was found that the Texas system
had a coefficient of adjustment significantly greater than the other
systems except Australia where the coefficients were not significanly
different (table 106). The slope in the Texas model was significantly
greater than any other slope implying that the Texas port price
followed c and f import prices more closely. The Texas model also
reflected a significantly smaller intercept term than any other model
indicating less unexplained transfer cost. Based on these results it
seems reasonable to conclude that the Texas system was relatively more
efficient than the others in transmitting price information from the
importing country to the port level. The Argentine and South African
systems were very slow in transmitting price signals and exhibited a
weak relationsip between c and f prices and port prices. Although the
Australian system transmitted price information at the same rate as
the Texas system, the signals were not accurate, reflecting some
distortion in the system.
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Table 105. Results of Simple Regression Model Analysis of Adjusted
c and f Sorghum Price in Japan and Ibrt Level Price, 1973-76
DEP VAR: ADJC&Fa
Variables
Argentina Australia S. Africa
Ihrameter Estimates0
Texas
Intercept 82.58
(11.59)
106.57
(22.77)
96.72
(13.66)
53.24
(7.06)
fob Bart Price for
Sorghum (slope) .209
(2.92)
.060
(.805)
.144
(2.23)
.488
(7.25)
R-Square .366 .079 .347 .645
Correlation .134 .006 .120 .416
Slope Significantly
Different from One Yes Yes Yes Yes
Significance of
Overall Model .0001 .1001 .0002 .0001
ADJC&F is c and f price for sorghum in Japan minus ocean freight
from country of origin.
t values are in parentheses; a number greater in absolute value
than 2.03 indicates significance at .05 level.
376
Table 106* Bart Level Country Comparison of Adjustment Coefficients,
Slope, and Intercept Terms, 1973-76
Adjustment Slope Intercept
Coefficients'1 Coefficients Comparison
AUS > ARGb
(2.47)
ARG = SA
( .08)
TX > ARG
(2.12)
AUS > SA
(2.36)
TX * AUS
( .03)
TX > SA
(2.40)
ARG > AUS
(2.13)
ARG * SA
( .86)
TX > ARG
(3.51)
AUS = SA
(1.20)
TX > AUS
(6.52)
TX > SA
(5.21)
ARG < AUS
(4.13)
ARG < SA
(1.81)
TX < ARG
(3.52)
SA < AUS*
(1.65)
TX < AUS
(8.94)
TX < SA
(5.97)
^ARG « Argentina, AUS * Australia, SA * South Africa, TX ■ Texas.
t values are in parentheses; value greater than 1.69
indicates significance at .05 level,
significant at .10 level.
377
Period 1977-80
During this period the Argetine grain marketing system was
returned to the private trade, while Australia and South Africa
maintained marketing boards. A dummy variable for the grain embargo
was included in each model, but was significant only for Argenina and
Australia (table 107).
The Argentine model reflected the best fit with an R-square of
.997. The lagged price of sorghum in Japan, exchange rates, the dummy
variable, and lagged port price were all significant factors in
explaining the port price. The results indicate that the U.S. grain
embargo of the USSR yielded higher sorghum prices in Argentina. A
real price increase of F223 ($.20)/MT can be attributed to the
embargo. A one peso increase in c and f Japan sorghum price resulted
in a P.84 increase in the Argentine f.o.b. price the same month. The
coefficient of adjustment indicated that about half (.49) of the price
adjustment was occurring in the first month after a price change.
Four and one-half months were required for 95 percent adjustment to
occur•
The c and f price Japan was found to be a significant
factor in establishing the Australian port price. A one $A increase in
the c and f price resulted in a $A.31 increase in the Australian port
price. The dummy variable for the embargo was significant and indicated
that the Australian f.o.b. price was $A2.77 higher due to the embargo.
The adjustment coefficient was .22 resulting in 7ery slow adjustment to
price changes abroad. About 12 months were required for 95 percent of
the price adjustment to occur. The R-square for this model was .942
Table 107. Results of Distributed Lag Analysis of Bart Level Grain
Sorghum Brices, 1977-30
Variables faramecar Estimates3
DEP VAR: FOB Argentina Australia S. Africa Texas
Port Price -
Mean Value E2224.09 $A75.78 R71.37 $120.02
Intercept -222.77 -7.32 -9.72 12.03
(-4.06) (-1.96) (-1.65) (1.09)
c and f Sorghum -
Japan .336 .309 .739 .137
(23.45) (6.13) (5.57) (3.24)
c and f Sorghum
lagged one month -.400 -.247 -.419
(-4.31) (-4.60) (-2.69)
Stockfeed Wheat .201
(2.80)
cif Com - Rotterdam
Exchange Rates0 2.11 .243
(2.64) (3.44)
Exchange Rates -
lagged one month -2.14
(-2.59)
DEMBC 223.41 2.77
(3.62) (2.61)
fob Sorghum -
lagged one month .515 .781 .778 .456
(5.22) (11.93) (10.78) (4.72)
Coefficient of
adjustment .485 .219 .222 .544
(1.35) (.422) (.372) (7.53)
R-Square .997 .942 .914 .650
Significance of
Overall Model .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001
<1
All estimates are in domestic real currencies per MX. Numbers
in parentheses are t-values; any value greater in absolute value
than 2.00 indicates statistical significance at .03 level.
Exchange rate between Argentine Iteso and U.S. Dollar.
^Dummy variable for period of U.S. grain embargo, Jan-Dee 1980.
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indicating that the explanatory variables were explaining almost all of
the variation in the Australian port price.
The South African model and an R-square of .914 reflecting a
relatively good fit of the model. However, the lag of the Japanese
price was negative indicating an inverse relationship between port price
and c and f price the previous month. A one Rand increase in the
Japanese price resulted in a R.25 decline in the South African port
price, reflecting the higher inventories the preceding month. The
adjustment coefficient was low revealing that less than one-fourth of
the adjustment occurred in the first month. Twelve months were required
for 95 percent of price adjustment to occur.
The Texas model revealed that c and f Japan and c.i.f. corn at
Rotterdam were important factors. The current month price in Japan
was significant and implied that a one dollar increase in Japanese
prices results in a $.14 increase in the Texas port price. The
adjustment coefficient revealed that about one-half of the price
adjustment occurred during the initial month and that four months were
required for 95 percent adjustment. The c.i.f. Rotterdam corn price
coefficient indicated that a one dollar increase overseas resulted in
a $.24 increase in sorghum at the Texas Gulf.
The results of the simple regression analysis suggest that Texas
had the strongest relationship between adjusted c and f Japan and port
prices as indicated by a correlation of .29 (table 108). The slope of
this model was not significantly different from one and the intercept
was not significant, implying a relatively strong relationship between
the prices.
Table 108. Results of Simple Regression Model Analysis of Adjusted
c and f Sorghum Price in Japan and Ibrt Level Prices, 1977-80
DEP VAR: ADJC&Fa
Variables
Argentina Australia S. Africa
Parameter Estimates
Texas
Intercept 96.72
(20.00)
103.36
(32.56)
127.97
(24.78)
19.17
(1.33)
fob Ibrt Price for
Sorghum (slope) .105
(2.46)
.136
(4.61)
-.066
(-1-62)
.809
(6.75)
R-Square .222 .463 .007 .541
Correlation .049 .214 .000 .293
Slope Significantly
Different from One Yes Yes Yes No
Significance of
Overall Model .0002 .0001 .518 .0001
ADJ c and f is c and f price for sorghum in Japan minus ocean
freight from country of origin.
t values are in parentnesis; a value greater in absolute value
than 2.00 indicates significance at .05 level.
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The Australian model reflected a correlation of .214 between the
prices, but had a slope coefficient of .14. The Argentine model had
.05 correlation and a slope different from one indicating a poor
relationship between the two price series. The South African model
also reflected a relatively poor relationship between the series
indicated by correlation of 0 and a slope of -.066 (table 108).
The significantly different adjustment coefficients were those of
Australia and Argetina, Texas and South Africa, and Texas and
Australia. Texas had a slope coefficient significantly greater than
all the others (table 108). It is also important to note that the
Texas system had significantly less unexplained transfer costs than
any of the other systems(table 109).
As before, it is not possible to make a general statement
regarding hypothesis one. Concerning the speed of price adjustment
during the first period, it appears that two of the board systems,
Australia and South Africa, adjusted to changes in world price at
about the same rate. The Texas system responded at a significantly
greater rate than either of the previously mentioned board systems.
There was no difference in the rate of adjustment between Texas and
Argentina. However, the Texas system reflected price changes more
accurately than any other system during this period. It is possible
to conclude that the Texas system was relatively more efficient in
reflecting price changes than Australia or South Africa. Therefore
hypothesis one cannot be rejected in relation to those two board
systems
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Table 109, Bart Level Country Comparison of Adjustment Coefficients,
Slope, and Intercept Terms, 1977-80
Adjustment
Coefficientsa
Slope
Coefficients
Intercept
Comparison
ARG > AUSb AUS 38 ARG AUS ARG
(2.32) ( .71) (1.39)
ARG * SA SA < ARG SA > ARG
(2.22) (3.45) (5.30)
ARG = TX TX > ARG TX < ARG
( .42) (6.19) (5.73)
AUS * SA AUS > SA AUS < SA
( .03) (4.73) (4.8)
TX > AUS TX > AUS TX < AUS
(2.77) (6.56) (6.84)
TX > SA TX > SA TX < SA
(2.66) (8.16) (8.41)
^ARG = Argentina, AUS 38 Australia, SA * South Africa, TX * Texas.
t values are in parentheses; value greater than 1.65
indicates significance at .05 level.
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Daring the second period (1977-80) hypothesis one may not be
rejected when comparing the Texas system to Australia and South
Africa. It can be concluded that the board systems reflected price
changes in Japan with less speed and accuracy than the market-oriented
system in Texas. However, since Argentina also operated under minimal
government control during this time, its system must also be compared
to the board systems. Argentina adjusted quicker than Australia, but
slower than South Africa. However, the Argetine system reflected
price changes more accurately than South Africa, but to about the same
degree as Australia. Therefore, the results are inconclusive and
suggest that the Argetine system was relatively more efficient than
the South African system, but not more efficient than the Australian
system.
Results of Farm Price Adjustment During Bariods of Increasing
and Decreasing World Prices
One of the main objectives of producer marketing boards
is to raise and stabilize the price paid to farmer members.
The implication of this objective suggests that the prices paid
to members should adjust quickly when world price level is
increasing, but should adjust at a slower rate when prices
are declining. The purpose of this analysis was to determine
if the prices paid to board members in Australia adjusted at
different rates when world prices trended up and down. The Argen¬
tine system was not analyzed because only increasing prices
were experienced during the board period (figure 19 p.352).
Australia was analyzed from 1972-1977 to determine the
response to increasing and declining prices. Analysis of
covariance was used to determine the effect of price changes
on the farm price. Dummy variables were employed; a 1 was
used for the increasing period of world prices (February
1972-October 1974), while a -1 was used during the declin¬
ing price period (December 1974-August 1977). Results are
presented in Table 110.
The fob sorghum price indicated that a one dollar incr¬
ease at the port resulted in a $A .17 increase at the farm
during the same month. The lagged fob coefficient was nega¬
tive indicating an inverse relationship between the farm
price and fob price the preceeding month. Although trans¬
port had a positive sign, the lagged coefficient was nega¬
tive implying a $A 7.89 decline in farm price occurred from
a one dollar increase in rates the previous month. The
coefficient of adjustment was .05 indicating that five
percent of the adjustment in farm price occurred during
the first month.
The interaction terms for fob and lagged fob prices
indicated that a net response of $A .03 could be expected
in farm price. However, the interaction term between the
lagged farm price and the dummy variable was not significant
indicating the price paid by the Board did not adjust at
a faster rate wnen prices on the world market were increasing
than when world prices were falling.
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Table 110. Results of Distributed Lag Analysis for Australia
During Periods of Increasing and Decreasing Prices
DEPVAR: Farm Price
Mean Value: $A68.48 Parameter Estimates
Variables
Intercept
.35
(•20;
fob sorghum price .17
(2.15)
fob sorghum-
lagged one month
-.21
(-2.39)
Transport 8.42
(14.60)
Transport lagged
one month
-7.89
(-11.45)
Interaction Term-Dummy
fob sorghum
and
-.38
(-5.22)
Interaction Term-Dummy
lagged fob
and
.41
(5.18)
Interaction Term-Dummy
lagged farm price
and
-.02
(-.46)
Farm price lagged one month .95
(23.19)
Adjustment Coefficient .05
(1.29)
R-Square .99
^eal Australian dollars per metric ton.
t values are in parentheses; number greater in absolute value
than 1.99 indicates significance at .05 level.
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Analysis of Marketing Board Price Level and Variability
To evaluate the impact of marketing boards on price level and
variability at the port, the following analyses were conducted.
Hypothesis 2: Prices were higher and more stable in the Argentine
and Australian systems during their marketing board periods than in the
market-oriented periods.
Formally, these hypotheses are:
H0 : PB > PNB a“d Ho: a2B < a2NB
where:
P.,, * mean board price
a
P^ * mean price under market oriented system
2
cr“ = price variability under board system
2
g ^ ** price variability under market oriented system.
The basis for this analysis lies in the objectives of the marketing
boards and the agricultural policy environment in which they function.
Marketing boards may attempt to:
(1) raise farm income, (2) stabilize prices received by producers, or
(3) earn foreign exchange. The NSW Grain Sorghum Board has attempted
to accomplish the first two objectives. The NGB of Argentina used
the board to raise the port price and generate foreign exchange for
use in the industrial sector. Therefore, hypothesis two was
evaluated entirely within the constructs of these objectives.
Since price series with little variation have a relatively slow
adjustment rate, it is important to identify the variability examin¬
ed in this study. Comparing variability in prices not adjusted for
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common factors would yield the same results as analyzing the adjust¬
ment coefficients. Therefore, it was necessary to analyze the var¬
iability net of the effects of the local market environment. The fob
port prices were adjusted for the general rise in the price level,
exchange rate changes, and seasonal factors. The unexplained variat¬
ion, or net variation, was analyzed as the variance of the residuals
and compared between countries.
Due to the qualitative, dichotomous nature of the marketing board,
a regression model employing dummy variables was deemed appropriate for
this analysis. The analysis of the level of board prices is
explained first, followed by a discussion of the test of board price
stability.
Model Specification
1. Analysis of Price Level Under A Marketing Board System
A single equation was specified for each of the systems in
Argentina and Australia to analyze the impact of the marketing boards
on price level. The Argentine grain marketing system was examined
from 1969-80, the board period ranging between August 1973 and March
1976. Australia was evaluated from 1969-80 and the board period from
1972-80. This analysis was not performed on the South African system
because the Maize Board merely implements the floor price scheme and
therefore does not attempt to enhance sorghum price within the country
or at the port. Formally,
10.18 P , a +b,P.+B„P + B,F + B.XC + MX + D2Z + E„D 1 j 2 C 3 4 t tt
where
monthly average f.o.b. price for grain sorghum,
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P « monthly average price for sorghum in Japan,
* monthly average price of corn in Rotterdam,
F « monthly average ocean freight between exporting board
country and Japan,
XC « rate of exchange between foreign currency and U. S. dollar,
E * random error term,
t
Di * dummy coefficient,
Xt ® 1 during board years, 0 otherwise (intercept dummy),
Zt * an *-nteract:i-on term between marketing board
and Japanese c and f price (slope dummy) •
The following hypotheses were tested:
Hoi : Dl = 0 which implies there is no significant difference
in mean f.o.b. port price during board and nonboard
periods. If Ho is rejected one could conclude that
the marketing board system had a significant effect
on price level.
Ho2 : D2 - 0 which accounts for the interaction between the Japanese
price and board periods.
2. Analysis of Price Stability Under Marketing Board System
In order to effectively test if board prices have been less
variable than free market prices it was necessary to compare equations
specified for Argentina and Australia to those of a proxy for world
price. The Argentine system was analyzed from August 1973 to March
1976, while Australia was examined from 1972 to 1980. Therefore, two
separate comparisons were necessary.
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a. Argentina vs World Price
10.19 P, - a. + B.WFL + B0XC + B-D2 + B.D3 + B.D.b 1 1 2 3 4 5 4 + eu
10.20 P . - a0 + BJH + B0XC + B0D2 + B, D3 + BCD4 + e0^nb 2 1 2 3 4 5 2t
where
P^ = monthly average price for grain sorghum f.o.b. Argentina,
P . = monthly average sorghum price, c and f, Japan,nb
XC = monthly average exchange rate between Argentine peso and
U.S. dollar and Japanese Yen and U.S. dollar,
WFI = wholesale price indices,
= seasonal dummy variables,
e^t * random error term.
The formal hypothesis test was Ho : V(e^) - VCe^) = 0.
2 2 2
The F test was used where F - S^/S2 an<* ^i t*le samP^e
variance of the residuals,
b. Australia vs World Price
10.21 P - a. + B.WPI + B0XC + B0D2 + B.D3 + B..D. ,b 1 1 2 3 4 54 + e1+>It
10.22 pnb “ a2 + BiWEI + B2XC + B3D2 + B4D3 + B5D4 + e2t
where the variables are as before except
P^ = monthly average f.o.b. price in Australia,
XC * monthly average exchange rate between Australian dollar and
U.S. dollar and Japanese Yen and U.S. dollar.
Test Ho : VCe^ - V(e2> = 0
This analysis allows a direct comparison of board and nonboard
systems to determine the impact of boards on price stability. If
prices under the board system have been more stable than the variations
on the world market, the variance of el should be less than e2. In
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both analyses the seasonal dummy variables were tested to determine the
price variation explained by seasonal effects.
The National Grain Board (NGB) of Argentina controlled all
sales of sorghum from August 1973 to March 1976. The analysis of
price level included the period 1969-80, while the variability
analysis included only the period during which the NGB controlled
grain marketing. It was necessary to include the longer period in the
dummy variable analysis of price level to allow for periods of board
and non-board marketing. The variability analysis included only the
marketing board period to allow for comparisons in variability of
Argentine and Japanese sorghum prices.
Although no stated objectives of the board's policy are available
in the literature, Wainio indicates that support prices for sorghum
were in effect during this period. Wilson indicates that farmers were
paid subsidies above the domestic price level to encourage production,
alleviate social unrest, and generate foreign exchange. Recent
evidence suggests that the latter objective prevailed.
As the world price level for grains increased between 1973 and
1975, the Argentine f.o.b. price followed (figure 19). However,
after August 1974 when the f.o.b. price increased rapidly, the
Argentine farm price leveled off and even declined. This provides
superficial evidence that the NGB was using grain sales as a foreign
exchange earning mechanism. The following analysis further supports
this contention.
The equation of board price level contained two dummy variables:
one to determine only the price effect in board years and the other to
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determine the interaction effect of the price of sorghum in Japan on
port price level. As with the other models, variables not significant
at .10 level were removed and the equation reestimated.
The F statistic was used to determine the significance of the dummy
variables in each equation (Kmenta p. 370).
F
2 2
( RIS.q-k ),
where Rj* * R~scluare t^le containing the dummy variables,
_2 = R-square of the model with dummy variables removed,
*R
n = number of observations,
q = number of independent variables in full model,
k = number of independent variables in reduced model.
Results of Price Level and Variability Analysis Under A Marketing
Board System - Argentina
Results of the Argentine model indicate that the c and f price of
sorghum in Japan, c.i.f. corn in Rotterdam, ocean freight to Japan, and
the f.o.b, sorghum lagged one month were significant explanatory
factors (table 111).
A one peso increase in sorghum prices in Japan resulted in a P.34
increase at the port in Argentina. A one peso increase in corn at
Rotterdam yielded a .41 increase in port sorghum prices in Argentina.
The coefficient for ocean freight indicated a one peso increase would
reduce the f.o.b. price by P.39. The coefficient of adjustment was .35
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Table 111. Results of Marketing Board Level Analysis for Argentina and
Australia, 1969-80
DEP VAR: f.o.b. Sorghum Price
<1 W
Mean Value
Argentina Australia
P2,786.89 74.52
Intercept 113.51b -3.01
(1.62) (-1.35)
c and f Sorghum Japan .344
(5.42)
cif Corn - Rotterdam .407 .152
(6.47) (4.39)
cif Corn - Rotterdam - lagged one month -.448 -.150
(-7.60) (-4.26)
Ocean freight -.391
(-3.31)
Stockfeed wheat .172
(3.65)
Dummy for board years 43.26 -3.83
Interaction dummy between board
(.489) (-2.04)
years and sorghum in Japan .015 .033
(2.41) (2.31)
f.o.b. Sorghum - lagged one month .655 .843
(11.89) (21.53)
Coefficient of adjustment .345 .157
R-square Full Model .9867 .9285
R-square Reduced Model .9861 .9257
All estimates are in real domestic currency per metric ton.
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indicating that one-third of the port price adjustment occurred during
the first month.
In testing for the significance of the dummy variables, F was
calculated to be
.9867-.9861 x 143-8
1-.9867 8-6
3.022.
When compared to the tabular F = 3.00, the dummy variables were
significant at the .05 level. The null hypothesis can be rejected and
it may be concluded that the NGB in Argentina was a significant factor
in raising the f .o.b. port price for sorghum between 1973 and 1976.
The analysis of price variability compared fluctuations in the
Argentine port price during the board period to Japanese price
movements during the same period. Prices in both locations were
adjusted for general price rise, exchange rates, and seasonal effects.
The resulting prices in the two locations were then compared for
variability (table 111).
The R-square for the Argentine model was .9987. The wholesale
price index was significant as were exchange rates. Second and third
quarter seasonal dummies were also significant and negative implying
that sorghum prices are generally lower during these seasons. The
Japanese model had an R-square of .6772 and indicated that exchange
rates and second and third quarter seasonality were significant
factors in establishing the c and f price. The wholesale price index
appeared to have no significant effect ou prices.
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To determine the variability of the two price series, the
residuals from the models above were analyzed to determine their
unexplained variability* The analysis compared the unexplained
variability, or random error, in the two series* The variances in the
residuals of the two equations were tested using the F ratio (Kmenta,
Steele and Torrie), Variance of the residuals from the Argentine
model was 81,008.8, while that from the Japanese model was 27,478,218
(table 112). The calculated F value was:
27*478,218
81,008.8
339.2.
The calculated F value was greater than the tabular value of 2.39 and
allowed rejection of the null hypothesis at the .01 level that the two
variances were equal.
With respect to Argentina, hypothesis two may not be rejected.
It may be concluded that port prices for sorghum were significantly
higher and more stable during the marketing board period than during
the nonboard period.
Australia
The New South Wales Marketing Board has been in operation since
1972. Therefore, the Australian f.o.b. port price level was analyzed
from 1969-80 and price variability from 1972-80.
Australia responded positively to increases in the c.i.f. corn
price as the f.o.b. port price increased by $A. 15 (table 113).
Stockfeed wheat was also a significant factor indicating that a one
dollar A increase resulted in a $A. 17 increase in sorghum at the port.
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Table 112. Results of Marketing Board Price Variability Analysis for
Argentina, 1973-76
Variables Parameter
a
Estimates
DEP VAR:
Argentina: Ibrt Price
Japan: c and f Japan
Argentina Japan
Intercept -687.34 17,080.53
(-3.98) (2.73)
Wholesale price index 1,261.34 10,359.86
(1.86) (1.14)
Lagged wholesale price index 13,910.50
(-1.62)
Exchange rate 27,008.04 -715.35
(12.02) (-5.44)
Dummy 2d quarter -244.14 -3,794.28
(-2.99) (-2.65)
Dummy 3d quarter -240.05 -2,862.56
(-3.14) (-2.05)
Dummy 4th quarter 12.30 -2,052.53
(.17) (-1.45)
R-square .9987 .6772
Variance of Residuals 81,008.8 27,478,218
Estimates are in Argentine pesos per metric ton. Numbers in
parentheses are t-values; any value greater in absolute value than
2.03 indicates statistical significance at .05 level.
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Table 113. Results of Marketing Board Price Variability Analysis for
Australia, 1972-80
Variables Ihrameter Estimates3,
DEP VAR:
Australia: Ibrt Price
Japan: c and f Japan
Australia Japan
Intercept 151.25
(9.32)
52.25
(2.92)
Wholesale price index 28.22
(5.37)
91.70
(8.49)
Exchange rate -80.33
(-9.25)
-.0929
(-1.77)
Dummy 2d quarter -.4893
(-.33)
-4.43
(-1.66)
Dummy 3d quarter 1.1191
(.76)
1.05
(.39)
Dummy 4th quarter 2.6443
(1.80)
3.67
(1.36)
Dummy embargo 12.4445
(5.72)
13.22
(3.92)
R-square .8285 .6139
Variance of Residuals 105.062 348.786
Estimates are in real Australian dollars per imetric ton. Numbers
in parentheses are t-values; any value greater
1.99 indicates statistical significance at ,05
in absolute
level•
value than
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The coefficient of adjustment indicates that .16 of the price adjustment
occurred during the first month.
The calculated F statistic for the significance of the dummy
variables was:
.9285-.9257 , 143-9 .
1-.9285 K 7-5 ' 2.64.
The F statistic was not significant when compared to the tabular value
of 3.00. Therefore, the board did not significantly affect port price
level between 1972-80.
In analyzing board and world price variability both series were
adjusted for wholesale price changes, exchange rate changes, seasonal
effects and changes caused by the 1980 grain embargo. Wholesale price
and exchange rates both had significant effects on the model. The
embargo resulted in a $A2.44/MT increase in prices in the Australian
market. R-square for this model was .8285.
Wholesale prices and exchange rates were also significant in the
Japanese model. Second quarter seasonal effects were significant and
negative indicating that Japanese prices have declined $A4.43/MT due
to seasonality. The U.S. grain embargo resulted in significantly
higher prices in Japan by about $A13.22/MT.
Variance of the Australian price residuals was 105.062 compared to
348.786 for the Japanese residuals. The calculated F value was:
348.786
105.062
F 3.32.
The tabular value of F was 1.80 resulting in rejection of the null
hypothesis at the .01 level. It can be concluded that prices were
more stable under the board than on the world market.
With respect to hypothesis two, it may not be concluded that
prices were higher under the board system. However, it may be
concluded that port prices in Australia were more stable than world
market prices.
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CHAPTER X
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND . IMPLICATIONS
Summary and Conclusions
The role and importance of agricultural prices are well documented
(Bressler and King, Tomek and Robinson). Agricultural production and
marketing decision makers rely heavily on price signals for timely and
accurate information regarding supply and demand conditions worldwide.
The efficiency with which price information was passed back to
producers under varying degrees of government intervention was the focus
of this study. Sporleder and Chavas identified two main aspects of price
efficiency: a) macro - the role of prices in the marketing system,
and b) micro - intrafirm efficiency on profit maximization. Only the
concept of macro price efficiency was addressed here.
Price efficiency was defined as the timeliness and accuracy with
which price information is transmitted between levels in a marketing
channel (Griffith, Sporleder and Chavas). This study examined the
prevailing world price for grain sorghum between 1973 and 1980 to
determine how efficiently price changes were transmitted from the source
of demand in Japan to the port and farm level in Argentina, Australia,
South Africa, and Texas.
Australia and South Africa presently have producer marketing boards
which determine the producer price for grain sorghum and have been in
operation since 1972 and 1956, respectively. Although Argentina presently
functions in a relatively free or open market, periods of total government
control of grain pricing occurred between August 1973 and March 1976.
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Therefore, Argentina provided a unique setting in which to examine the
effect of a government marketing board on price efficiency. The United
States, having never experienced a marketing board, provided the
environment for analyzing price efficiency under minimal government
intervetion.
Because of increasing government-to-government sales on the export
grain market, it has been hypothesized that the market-oriented grain
marketing system in the U.S. may not serve the best interests of producers
and consumers (McCalla and Schmitz). Recent public debate in the U.S.
has centered on redirecting the market-oriented grain marketing system
to a more market-managed network. Bale and Lutz hypothesize that the
move toward a more market-managed system in the U.S. could result in
severe distortion of the true world supply/demand situation, thereby
reducing the speed with which price signals are transmitted to producers.
The main purpose of this study was to determine the effect of
varying degrees of government intervetion on the efficiency with which
sorghum prices were transmitted from Japan to the four major exporting
countries. The major objectives of the study were to:
1. Measure the ability of world and port prices to quickly and
accurately transmit price information from the source of
demand in an importing country to producers in the grain
exporting countries of the U.S., Argentina, Australia,
and South Africa.
2. Analyze the imact of marketing boards on the level and
stability of grain sorghum prices at the port level in
Argentina and Australia.
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3. Describe the factors affecting pricing efficiency of the
major U. S* competitors in the international grain sorghum
market.
4. Develop a taxonomy for marketing boards which allows
behavioral implications to be established.
5. Identify emerging issues relevant to Texas and U.S. grain
sorghum and substitute grain crops.
Seemingly unrelated regression (SDR) was used to estimate a system
of distributed lag equations to evaluate the effect of marketing boards
on price efficiency. Dummy variables were used to assess the impact
of marketing boards on price level, while board price stability was
compared to world price stability using regression analysis.
The description of the world coarse grain trade focused on
concentration among the major trading nations. Trends in market share
for importers and exporters were identified as were trends in government
involvement. The four country descriptions examined the role of
government in each marketing system and assessed its impact on
concentration among firms operating at the port level. The production
and marketing system for sorghum was described for each country and
key issues and policies relating to pricing, transportation, and
storage were identified.
Conclusions from Descriptive Analysis
Rrivate exporters dominate the trade of coarse grains, handling
83 percent of foreign sales in 1981. State trading exporters handled
7 percent of the export trade, while agricultural cooperatives handled
10 percent (table 13, p. 35). Among sorghum exporters, it was found
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that the U.S. dominates with 53 percent of the market, followed by
Argentina with 32 percent, Australia with 4 percent, and South Africa
with 1.5 percent.
State trading among importers almost doubled between 1977 and 1931,
going to 42 percent. Private traders' share of the import market declined
from 63 percent to 49 percent during this same period, while cooperatives
maintained 9 percent of the market. Japan is the leading sorghum
importer, accounting for over 50 percent of world purchases. Mexico
was second with 14 percent, followed by Israel and Venezuela with about
six percent each (table 7, p. 23).
It was found also that barter agreements between grain importers
and exporters were becoming more prevalent. Argentina has recently
announced an agreement with Iraq under which wheat and rice will be
supplied for oil. South Africa has a similar arrangement with Romania
whereby 500,000 MT of corn will be exchanged for 200,000 MT of
manufactured fertilizer.
Bilateral grain sales agreements among countries were found to be
increasing. Argentina intends to ship 360,000 MT of corn and 180,000
MT of sorghum to Iran under bilateral terms in 1932/83. Since 1981
Argentina has exported 80 percent of its total coarse grain crop to
the Soviet Union under bilateral terms. Australia has major bilateral
agreements with China, USSR, Egypt, and Iraq for wheat sales through
1984. As world supplies remain high, it appears that major coarse
grain exporters may be turning to bilateral terms to ensure markets
for their crops.
Japan
This section outlines the results of the Japanese description.
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Results of the Japanese description indicate that tremendous growth
has occurred in per capita income since 1954. A fifty fold increase has
resulted from the level of income rising from $163 in 1954 to $8,233
in 1978. Recent government estimates indicated that meat demand should
increase to 3.2 MMT by 1985. A 4.2 percent increase was projected for
beef consumption, a 3.2 percent increase for pork, and a 2.4 percent
increase for chicken.
Domestic feed grain production has been declining, primarily due to
an enticing program for rice production. As a result of expanded
livestock production and reduced domestic feed grain output, feed grain
imports have expanded 72 percent since 1970 (table 25 p.94). Grain
sorghum imports increased 12 percent during this period to 4.3 MMT.
Feed grain imports enter the Japanese market relatively free of
government control. However, agricultural cooperatives and trading
firms control almost all of the imports.
The formula feed industry was moderately concentrated as 11 firms
controlled 80 percent of the market. Zennoh, the largest cooperative,
controlled 40 percent of the market. The next ten firms had 40
percent, while the remaining 73 firms had 20 percent.
Half of the formula feed produced since 1960 has been for poultry,
30 percent for swine, and nine percent for each of dairy and beef
cattle. Zennoh completely controls pricing and meets quarterly to set
the price of all formula feeds in Japan.
The U.S. relative position in the Japanese sorghum market declined
steadily after 1972, but recovered in 1980 as Argentina increased
sales to the Soviet Union. By 1981 the U.S. had 91 percent of the
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market, followed by Australia with 7 percent and South Africa with
1 percent.
It was found also that Japan began a rice disposal program in
1982 aimed at reducing the surplus. Although this had displaced some
feed grain imports, the total extent is as yet unmeasurable.
Argentina
Government's role in the Argentine grain marketing system became
evident in 1933 with the creation of the GR3. This action was
followed by support prices for grains, a fixed exchange cate for
exports, and passage of the elevator and grain laws giving the
government a definitive role in the grain marketing system.
Juan Beron's rise to power brought greater government intervention
with the formation of IAFL to act as the state trading monopoly. The
trend in government direction of the system continued until 1956 when
Baron was overthrown and IAPI abolished. The marketing of grains was
returned to the private sector and the NGB was created to implement
grain pricing policy. However, the return to market orientation was
overshadowed by the introduction of export retention taxes.
With Beron's reemergence to power in 1973, the NGB assumed monopoly
control of the grain marketing system. The government's role was more
pervasive than before as all aspects of the system were regulated
including: buying and selling for domestic and export use, transport,
and marketing. In March 1976, control of the marketing system returned
to the private sector with only port elevators remaining under control
of the NGB. Since then, the grain marketing system has functioned
relatively free of government intervention.
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The Ley de Granos 1979 dominates the agricultural policy environment
of Argentina* Four new private export elevators have recently been
constructed and cooperatives are in the process of renovating two older
NO port facilities. These actions signal the return of the functions
performed at the export level to the private sector. Because of capital
constraints, cooperatives have been slower to react to the Ley than
private firms.
The export marketing system is becoming increasingly more efficient
as indicated by reduced congestion, increased throughput, more storage
at the port level, and a general trend toward a more market oriented
network. The primary implicaton of this increased capacity is that
with reduced marketing costs, Argentina could become an even greater
competitor of the U.S. in coarse grain markets worldwide.
There were about 140 firms in the Argentine grain and oilseed
export industry in 1981 (NGB). The industry was composed of five
multinational export firms, five cooperatives, the NGB, and approximately
129 domestic export firms.
Industry concentration was moderate in 1978 with 20 firms controlling
97.3 percent of the market. By 1979 the 20 firm concentration ratio had
declined to 91.3 percent but was at 95 percent in 1981, reflecting an
increase in concentration. The top eight firms, which had 72.3 percent
of the market in 1978, had only 68.4 percent in 1981 reflecting a decrease
in concentration. However, in 1980 the top eight firms had 58.8 percent
of the market which suggests an increase in concentration between 1980 and
406
Among the top four firms, concentration has been fairly stable*
Between 1978 and 1980 their market share declined steadily from 43.4
percent to 34.3 percent. However, in 1981 the top four firms controlled
41 percent of the grain export market. No one firm has controlled more
than 12.5 percent of the market and that firm went out of business after
the 1980 season (NG3). In fact, only one firm has been among the top
four consistently since 1978, while one other has ranked first or second
in three of the four years examined.
While these data suggest some degree of concentration among the
top eight and top four firms, it is the author's contention that hasty
conclusions not be drawn regarding the competitiveness of the grain
export industry. Without further investigation of the regional power
of these groups of firms, initial conclusions may prove faulty.
Unfortunately, these data are not available so conclusions
regarding competitiveness cannot be drawn. Much of the increase in
competition among the exporting firms can be attributed to the Ley de
Granos 1979 which allowed private firms to build and operate port
storage facilities.
The degree of vertical integration exhibited by firms at the
export level is not well documented. However, recent developments in
Argentina indicate that the private exporting firms may be beginning
to integrate backward toward the production level. Several of the
private export firms have agreements with acopiadores to deliver grain
directly to export facilities, bypassing the correador (broker) (Wainio).
If this signals the beginning of a trend, one could expect the partial
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elimination of the correador. There is no evidence to suggest that
private firms are moving into processing of grains for feed.
However, the two major second level (regional) cooperatives, ACA
and FACA, do have processing facilities and ACA has recently acquired
export facilities. FACA has 252 first level (local) cooperative members
and a total farmer membership of 150,000. It is important to realize
that FACA has its foundational roots in the Baronist movement of the
mid 1940's and consequently many of its member farmers are from the
non-landed class and represent the results of modified agrarian reform.
The Beron ideals, while not deep rooted, do have an influence on
management through the farmer members. A new soybean crushing plant with
1,000 MT per day capacity was recently built by FACA and represents
its first attempt at vertical integration.
ACA has 255 member locals and 230,000 producers and is not integrated
backward into production. However, ACA has had a feed compounding facility
at San Nicolas since 1977 with 400 MT per day capacity. This co-op
also has four oilseed crushihg plants constructed in 1953. Recent
forward integration attempts by ACA were made at Nicochea and Ramallo.
In December 1981, the agreement was sealed for the purchase of NGB port
facility number two at Nicochea. This facility has a 1,000 MT per hour
outload and 12,000 MT storage capacity. The Ramallo facility has 12,000
MT storage capacity and an inload/outload rate of 600 MT per hour.
The NGB now coordinates ship arrival with grain arrival at the
port and has reduced the long lines waiting to unload. Grain cannot
be unloaded at the port until the date specified on the certificate issued
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to the first-handler by the NGB. This data corresponds to scheduled ship
arrival which is usually known 15 days in advance.
Although these improvements have increased throughput considerably,
recent government estimates indicate that handling and other transfer
costs at the port level are higher than those experienced at U.S.
ports. Zemborain estimates that handling and port charges in Argentina
are 15 percent of the Rotterdam cif corn price, while those in the U.S.
are four percent. He also indicates that Argentine ocean freight and
demurrage are 26 percent of cif, while U.S. charges are 11 percent of
cif price. Argentine port charges are overall 26 percent higher than
U.S. charges.
Two main factors appear to be responsible for these higher
charges. The Argentine rail rate structure is such that a higher per
unit rate is charged as distance carried increases as opposed to a
decreasing per unit rate in the U.S. Shallow drafts along the Ihrana
River necessitate topping off at Buenos Aires or Bahia Blanca,
thereby increasing costs.
The latter factor is probably the most significant in causing
higher marketing costs because of the demurrage charges that may occur
at both river and ocean ports. Shallow drafts at some river bends
(less than 27 feet) require that large ships load only partially full;
they must then move to an ocean port to complete loading and may have to
wait to load in both locations. Therefore, charges are considerably
higher than they would be if ships could load to capacity at the port
level. It facilities were available to accommodate unit trains from the
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heart of the wheat belt, ships could load to capacity at the ocean
ports.
Argentina is experiencing greater private investment at all
levels in the export marketing system in spite of uncertainties due to
inflation, high capital costs, and an unstable political environment.
Argentina is a country of great agricultural potential, much of which
is still unrecognized because of constraints on the grain export
marketing system.
South Africa
Although the Maize Board dominates corn and sorghum marketing,
agricultural cooperatives are a powerful force in the system. Ninety
percent of the corn and 70 prcent of the sorghum is presently originated
by cooperatives, while they own or control about 90 percent of the
first-handler facilities. It is hypothesized that the cooperative
movement is a potentially dominant force capable of altering the
existing agricultural policy environment.
The Maize Board has assumed a more aggressive posture regarding
exports, due mainly to producer group efforts. More direct sales of
corn to foreign traders and governments are anticipated since NAMPO has
gained control of the Board's leadership positions. The previous policy
of weekly export tenders appears to have been modified by NAMBO leaders.
The Maize Board and private grain trading companies dominate the
export of corn and sorghum from South Africa. It has been the Board's
policy to sell 20-25 percent of the expportable surplus of corn under
government-to-government contract and to allow the private trade to
handle 70-75 percent.
In 1980 four major multinational grain trading companies were
represented in South Africa, including Cargill (General Overseas Holding),
Continental, Louis Dreyfus, and Ihilip Bros. The South African offices
of these large companies serve primarily as bidding agents for making
tender offers. The decision to buy grain from the Board is not made in
South Africa, but at the head offices of these major traders.
Several smaller domestic grain trading companies such as Leo Rapnaely
& Sons, Kann & Kann, and Agrimin also compete on export tenders. These
are generally relatively small operations with all major decisions being made
in Johannesbourg (Kansteiner).
Cooperatives generally do not export grain because of limited
expertise regarding the international market and its functions.
However, there is no regulation which prevents cooperatives from competing
on export tenders once they have been approved by the Board.
Three main ports, Durban, East London, and Cape Town, handle
virtually all of South Africa's grain exports. Normally two-thirds of
the com exported moves through East London, while Durban handles one-third
of the com and all of the grain sorghum (Kansteiner). Cape Town is
usually not used for corn or sorghum because of its distance from the
growing areas. The port elevators are owned and operated by the South
African Railways and Harbors Administration (SARH).
The physical efficiency with which South Africa's major grain
ports are operating supports Kansteiner's argument that the port
facilities are a bottleneck in the grain exporting system. The
turnover of 40.95 indicates that the overall system has limited port
storage. East London has a turnover ratio of 39, while Durban has a
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turnover of 44.65. The main implication of these high ratios is that
the port system is operating very near maximum capacity and there is
great potential for the development of congestion at the harbors.
These results support Kansteiner's contention that any delay in
ship arrival results in congestion at the port, especially with the
use of unit trains. He also indicates that Durban is the most
congested harbor which is supported by its relatively small storage
capacity and high turnover ratio. One can conclude that there is a
need for increased storage space at the ports to reduce congestion and
the rate at which the facilities are operating during peak periods.
South Africa has recently entered several barter agreements with
foreign countries. These arrangemets call for the trade of corn and
sorghum for phosphate fertilizer. This has had the effect of reducing
the amount of grain available to private export firms.
The combination of more barter agreements and increased direct
exports could have serious implications for private trading firms. It
may become increasingly difficult to meet export commitments using South
African grains if this trend continues.
Although lack of port storage was cited as a potential bottleneck
during peak harvest, South African corn and sorghum have been displacing
U.3. grains in the Japanese market. This may be the result of the Maize
Board's more aggressive stance on exports and favorable ocean freight
between the two countries. However, it does appear that South Africa
has the potential to be a major force in the Asian market.
Australia
The Australian Wheat Board (AW3) dominates the agriculural policy
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environment and grain marketing system. Due to the substitutability
between sorghum and stockfeed wheat, sorghum prices set by the sorghum
boards must be sensitive to changes in wheat prices. Sub-terminal and
port storage facilities are controlled by the AWB, reflecting its
domination of the system.
Australia's sub-terminal system has developed only in recent
years, but by 1980 had two MMT of storage. These facilities were built
mainly for the purpose of transferring grain from the older rail lines
to the new ANR system. Grain can be quickly put through the new
elevators and reach the port in less time. Sub-terminal storage is
about evenly split among N.S.W., Victoria, and Western Australia, each
with about 30 percent of total capacity. South Australia has three
percent, while Queensland has none.
In 1980 Australia had 18 major port terminals located throughout
the grain producing area. Twelve of the terminals, 67 percent, are
in South and Western Australia making farmer cooperatives the single
largest owner. The remaining six facilities are owned by respective
state BHA's. Bort terminal storage capacity ranges from 111,000 MT
in Queensland to 1,916,000 MT in Western Australia.
Port storage capacity is estimated at 5,251,000 MT or 23 percent
of total capacity. Ibrt storage, in Western Australia represents 36
percent of port terminal capacity, while South Australia and Victoria
have 33 percent and 20 percent of total port storage capacity;
N.S.W. and Queensland together represent 10 percent of port terminal
storage capacity.
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Haad ling and storage facilities have been expanded at several ports
in recent years to accommodate larger ships and greater grain volume.
However, inload/outload rates vary from 120 tons per hour at
Gladstone, Queensland, to 4,000 tons per hour at Kwinana, Western
Australia, which became operational in 1977. Seven of the ports have
outload rates of 800 tons per hour, while Kwinana can ship out 5,000
tons per hour. Western Australia has the largest export capability
measured at 5.5 million metric tons (MMT) (International Wheat Council
Report). South Australia has an export capacity of 2.5 MMT, while
Queensland can ship out 2.0 MMT. Australia's sustainable monthly
export capacity is now placed at 1.5 MMT which implies an annual flow
of 18 MMT.
Farmer cooperatives and state owned elevators dominate the first-
handler level in the Australian grain export marketing system. In
1960 Australia had 658 country elevators; by 1978 that number had
increased to 930, a 41 percent expansion in 18 years (Commonwealth
Bureau of Statistics). The average country elevator, which serves as
first receival point for grain deliveried, separates grain into major
classes and is located on or near rail services to facilitate grain
movement to the port.
The country elevator system developed separately in each state.
Individual states now have a Bulk Handling Authority (BHA) which is the
licensed representative of the AWB and owns and operates the country
facilities. The BHA in the respective states are:
New South Wales - Grain Handling Authority
Victoria - Grain Elevators Board of Victoria
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South Australia - South Australia Cooperative Bulk Handling Ltd.
Western Australia - Cooperative Bulk Handling Ltd. of Western Aus.
Queensland - The State Wheat Board of Queensland.
The BHA's in New South Wales, . Victoria, and Queensland are statutory
bodies, while the BHA's in Western and South Australia are privately
owned farmer cooperatives.
Since 1915 major Australian agricultural cooperatives have
effectively demonstrated efficiency in marketing agricultural products.
In 1920, eight major producer cooperatives, representing all Australian
States, formally established the Cooperative Federation of Australia.
They opened a selling office in London and associated with national
agricultural cooperative associations from New Zealand, South Africa
and Rhodesia. In addition to handling commodities directed sold to it
by its members, this London office renders marketing services to a
number of commodity boards from member countries.
In recent years sixteen Australian agricultural cooperatives have
become shareholders in the international cooperative trading
organization established in Singapore by the International Cooperative
Alliance. The Australian Director of the trading organization is the
President of the Cooperative Federation of Australia.
In 1973 Australian cooperatives had a total membership of 3.4
million. Of this total, 12 percent or 408,000 were farmers who
accounted for 80 percent of the total business done by all cooperatives.
The most significant recent development regarding Australian
cooperatives is a proposal at the Federal level to form a central
bank for cooperatives. Although not yet approved, it is believed the
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proposal has much support and therefore an excellent chance for success.
The centralized cooperative banking system would be similar to the
U.S. cooperative system with one federal bank and several regional
offices»
Trade policy has been influenced by increasing government
intervention. There appears to be growing use of bilateral trade
agreements between Australia and importing countries. Recent long-term
agreements with Hid and Far Eastern nations verify this contention.
Export credit has recently been extended to some developing countries
in South East Asia for wheat purchases.
Three major constraints to the grain marketing system limit
Australia's potential to compete with the U.S. for Asian markets. First,
the country is frequently hit by severe drought in the major production
regions, making exportable surplus highly variable and unpredictable.
Second, the rail network has two problems which limit its operation
Three major gauges of rail have developed among Che states, making
interstate shipment costly and time consuming. The small size of
grain cars has been cited as another problem with the rail system.
Although most hauls are short, many require movement over steep
terrain with the small cars resulting in greater costs.
The third constraint is the frequency and length of labor disputes
in the port areas and other parts of the country. Trade and labor
unions represent well over half of the work force and can completely halt
movement of commodities.
Even though the grain export marketing system has several
bottlenecks, there is reason to believe that Australia has the potential
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to become a force in the Asian market. This has already occurred to some
extent in wheat. Given the new facilities on line and recognition of
the rail problems to be overcome, recent efforts have attempted to
increase car size and streamline the system by allowing interstate
grain shipments. If these efforts prove successful, it is probable
that Australia could increase its share of the Asian market, becoming
even more competitive with the United States.
Conclusions from Price Analysis
The purpose of this analysis was twofold: a) to compare the
coefficient of adjustment from a distributed lag model specified for
each country to determine which interior prices adjusted most rapidly
to changes at the export level and import level, and b) to determine the
effect of marketing boards in Argentina and Australia on price level
and variability at the port level. Since the Argentine system was
under marketing board control from 1973-76, it was necessary to
separate the analysis into two periods: one from 1973-76, the second
from 1977-80. The South African Maize Board merely implements a floor
price scheme for sorghum and does not attempt to alter price at the
farm, therefore, only the speed at the port level was examined. All
final estimates of the models were made in real domestic currency per
metric ton.
Between 1973-76 it was found that the Texas farm price for
sorghum adjusted to the port price at a significantly greater rate
than the Australian farm price paid to board members or the Argentine
price. Over two-thirds of the farm price adjustment occurred In the
Texas system during the first month, one-third occurred in the
417
Argentine system, and one-fourth occurred in the Australian system.
Based on these results it was possible to conclude that farm sorghum
prices in the market-oriented grain marketing system of Texas responded
quicker to price signals on the world market than the two market-managed
systems.
The port price for sorghum in each country was analyzed to determine
relative responsiveness to the cif price in Japan and cif corn at
Rotterdam. The Texas port price adjusted at a significantly greater
rate than port prices in Argentina and South Africa. However, no
significant difference existed between rates of adjustment in Australian
and Texas port prices. It can be concluded that the market-oriented
system in Texas was relatively more price efficient than the marketing
board systems in Argentina or South Africa, but that the Australian
board system was equally as efficient as the Texas system.
It was determined that Texas port prices accounted for 60 percent
of total adjustment during the first month, while Australian port
prices adjusted 59 percent. About one-fourth of the adjustment in port
prices occurred during the first month in Argentina and South Africa.
The main conclusion drawn from the distributed lag analysis during
this period was that farm prices in market-oriented systems responded
relatively more efficiently than farm prices in the marketing board
systems. Bart prices in the market-oriented system responded equally
as fast as the Australian board system, but more rapidly than the
Argentine or South African board systems.
During the second period of analysis (1977-80) it was determined
that Texas farm prices again responded at a significantly greater rate
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than farm prices in Argentina or Australia. However, it must be noted
that the Argentine grain marketing system was essentially free of board
control during this period. No significant difference existed in the rates
of adjustment between Argentina and Australia. Texas farm prices
adjusted by 44 percent during the first month while Argentine and
Australian prices adjusted by 21 percent and 14 percent, respectively,
Analysis of the adjustment in port prices revealed that the Texas
price responded at a significantly greater rate than port prices in
Australia and South Africa. There was no significant difference
between the port price adjustment rates In Texas and Argentina. The
rate of adjustment for the Texas model indicated that 54 percent of the
adjustment in port prices occurred in the first month, compared to
49 percent for Argentina, and 22 percent for Australia and South
Africa.
A dummy variable for the period of the U.S. grain embargo of the
Soviet Union was included in each model to determine the effect, if
any. While the dummy was not significant in the Texas or South African
models, it was in the Argentine and Australian models. The results
suggest that the Argentine port price was 223 pesos higher during the
embargo. The Australian port price was $A2.77 higher during the
embargo. This evidence provides partial support for the hypothesis
that U.S. competitors gained as a result of the January 1980 embargo.
The marketing board system in Australia was examined to determine
if a significant difference in rates of adjustment in £arm prices
existed during periods of Increasing world prices compared to declining
world prices. It was hypothesized that the board would respond more
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quickly as prices increased and at a slower rate as prices, fell.
This analysis could not he included for the Argentine system because
prices only increased between 1973 and 1976. The period of increasing
world prices was 1972-74, while, prices fell from 1975—77.
The coefficient of adjustment was .05 during this period, but was
not significant at the .05 level. The interaction dummy variable was
-.02 and insignificant. Therefore, it may be concluded that the Aus¬
tralian system responded at about the same rate whether prices, were
increasing or decreasing.
Board Price Level and Variability Analysis
Prices at the port level in Argentina and Australia were analyzed
to determine if they were higher and more stable during their respect¬
ive marketing board periods.
Argentine price level and variability were, examined from 1969-80.
The dummy variable in the model indicated that the Argentine port price
was significantly higher during the marketing board period. When port
price variability was compared to world price variability it was. con¬
cluded that board prices were more stable than world prices.
Together, these results suggest that the National Grain Board (NGB)
of Argentina was a significant factor in raising and stabilizing port
prices from 1973-76.
Australian price level and variability were analyzed from 1969-80.
Results of the price level analysis indicated that no significant
difference existed between port prices in Australia during the board and
nonboard periods. However, the price variability analysis indicated
that the port price had been significantly less variable than the
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world price since 1972. It was concluded that although the New South
Wales Grain Sorghum Board did not significantly raise port prices, it
did significantly reduce the variability in those prices.
Implications
The most significant implication of these conclusions is that the
market-oriented system appears to exhibit superior performance to the
market-managed system. Although many have espoused contrary claims,
few have empirical support of their contentions.
In both periods of analysis, prices in the market-oriented grain
marketing system in Texas responded more quickly to world price
conditions than the market-managed systems. Significant -improvements
resulted in Argentine price response after the marketing board reduced
control in 1976. Therefore, this study found no evidence of price
distortion in the market-oriented systems. To the contrary, price
signals were significantly more distorted in the market-managed
systems.
Although this study did not examine the extent of the price
distortion or the welfare implications, these seem to be areas where
future research efforts could focus.
Research efforts should also be directed toward determining the
welfare implications of marketing board systems. Although recent
research has examined the welfare implications of a grain cartel, little
work has been done with regard to marketing boards.
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